Highlights of the GPH-MILF Peace Negotiations

First Stage (1997-2000)
The GPH-MILF Peace Negotiations from 1997 to 2000 could be characterized as revolving mainly around security issues. Confidence-building measures and AFP-MILF ceasefire matters were firmed up in the early stages of the negotiations. This period likewise is distinguished as the First Stage, during which negotiations were conducted in Mindanao without third party facilitation or mediation. The “all-out war” in 2000 halted the conduct of the peace talks and caused the withdrawal of the MILF from the negotiating table.

Second Stage (2001- 2010)
The Second Stage of the negotiations is marked with the involvement of international players, particularly Malaysia, as third party facilitator.  The talks entered into substantive discussions outside of the cessation of hostilities and rehabilitation and development, with the entry of the parties into discussions on ancestral domain. Thirteen (13) years after the first GRP-MILF meeting, the talks are now in the midst of substantive discussions.

Negotiations conducted post MOA-AD highlight several important mechanisms such as the formation of the International Contact Group (ICG). The ICG is primarily mandated to exert the necessary leverage and assistance towards sustaining the trust and confidence of both sides at the negotiating table. The mandates of the ceasefire mechanism, especially of the IMT and that of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group or AHJAG, were likewise renewed at the event of the resumption of the GRP-MILF negotiations in December 2009.

The MOA-AD: An Aside
The draft Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was finalized and initialed on July 27, 2008, and was scheduled for signing on August 5, 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However, it was restrained by the Supreme Court on the same day. Serious objections to the draft agreement by local officials in the affected areas and the attacks from renegade MILF elements on civilian communities in several parts of Mindanao prompted a policy decision.  The non-signing triggered attacks from renegade MILF elements. By November 2008, Malaysia decided to pull out its contingent in the Malaysian-led IMT. It would only be in July the following year that backchannel efforts led to the effecting of a GPH SOMO (Suspension of Military Operations) and MILF SOMA (Suspension of Military Actions).

It should be noted that the ill-fated MOA-AD was NOT envisioned or intended to be the GPH-MILF Final Peace Agreement. Even if the MOA-AD were signed, the mechanisms and modalities of governance would still have had to be spelled out in a Final Peace Agreement / Comprehensive Compact. It only discussed the last of the three (3) substantive aspects of the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement (the two earlier aspects being Security Mechanisms and Rehabilitation & Development, which have been earlier agreed upon).